AER, JPE, QJE, RES期刊最新一期, 又见毛咕噜大神在讨论机器人与劳动市场！

凡是搞计量经济的，都关注这个号了

稿件：econometrics666@126.com

正文

(2020). "Erratum." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

Acemoglu, D. and P. Restrepo (2019). "Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.（毛咕噜大神）

We study the effects of industrial robots on US labor markets. We show theoretically that robots may reduce employment and wages and that their local impacts can be estimated using variation in exposure to robots?defined from industry-level advances in robotics and local industry employment. We estimate robust negative effects of robots on employment and wages across commuting zones. We also show that areas most exposed to robots after 1990 do not exhibit any differential trends before then, and robots? impact is distinct from other capital and technologies. One more robot per thousand workers reduces the employment-to-population ratio by 0.2 percentage points and wages by 0.42%.

Almås, I., et al. (2019). "Cutthroat Capitalism versus Cuddly Socialism: Are Americans More Meritocratic and Efficiency-Seeking than Scandinavians?" Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

There are striking differences in inequality and redistribution between the United States and Scandinavia. To study whether there are corresponding differences in social preferences, we conducted a large-scale international social preference experiment where Americans and Norwegians make distributive choices in identical environments. Combining the infrastructure of an international online labor market and that of a leading international data collection agency, we show that Americans and Norwegians differ significantly in fairness views, but not in the importance assigned to efficiency. We also provide causal evidence suggesting that fairness considerations are more fundamental for inequality acceptance than efficiency considerations.

Ameriks, J., et al. (2019). "Long-Term-Care Utility and Late-in-Life Saving." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

Older wealth holders spend down assets much more slowly than predicted by classic life-cycle models. This paper introduces health-dependent utility into a model with incomplete markets in which preferences for bequests, expenditures when in need of long-term care, and ordinary consumption combine with health and longevity uncertainty to explain saving behavior. To sharply identify motives, it develops strategic survey questions (SSQs) that elicit stated preferences. The model is estimated using these SSQs and wealth data from the Vanguard Research Initiative. The desire to self-insure against long-term-care risk explains a substantial fraction of the wealth holding of many older Americans.

Andreoni, J., et al. (2019). "When Fair Isn’t Fair: Understanding Choice Reversals Involving Social Preferences." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

In settings with uncertainty, tension exists between ex ante and ex post notions of fairness. Subjects in an experiment most commonly select the ex ante fair alternative ex ante and switch to the ex post fair alternative ex post. One potential explanation embraces consequentialism and construes reversals as time inconsistent. Another abandons consequentialism in favor of deontological (rule-based) ethics and thereby avoids the implication that revisions imply inconsistency. We test these explanations by examining contingent planning and the demand for commitment. Our findings suggest that the most common attitude toward fairness involves a time-consistent preference for applying a naive deontological heuristic.

Andries, M. and V. Haddad (2019). "Information Aversion." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

Information aversion?a preference-based fear of news flows?has rich implications for decisions involving information and risk-taking. It can explain key empirical patterns on how households pay attention to savings, namely, that investors observe their portfolios infrequently, particularly when stock prices are low or volatile. Receiving state-dependent alerts following sharp market downturns, such as during the financial crisis of 2008, improves welfare. Information-averse investors display an ostrich behavior: overhearing negative news prompts more inattention. Their fear of frequent news encourages them to hold undiversified portfolios.

Bagues, M. and P. Campa (2019). "Women and Power: Unpopular, Unwilling, or Held Back? A Comment." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

Caballero, R. J. and A. Simsek (2019). "A Model of Fickle Capital Flows and Retrenchment." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

We develop a model of gross capital flows and analyze their role in global financial stability. In our model, consistent with the data, when a country experiences asset fire sales, foreign investments exit (fickleness), while domestic investments abroad return home (retrenchment). When countries have symmetric expected returns and financial development, the benefits of retrenchment dominate the costs of fickleness and gross flows increase fire-sale prices. Fickleness, however, creates a coordination problem since it encourages local policy makers to restrict capital inflows. When countries are asymmetric, capital flows are driven by additional mechanisms?reach for safety and reach for yield?that can destabilize the receiving country.

Chodorow-Reich, G. and J. Wieland (2019). "Secular Labor Reallocation and Business Cycles." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

We revisit an old question: does industry labor reallocation affect the business cycle? Our empirical methodology exploits variation in a local labor market?s exposure to industry reallocation on the basis of the area?s initial industry composition and national industry employment trends for identification. Applied to confidential employment data over 1980?2014, we find sharp evidence of reallocation contributing to higher local area unemployment if it occurs during a national recession but little difference in outcomes during an expansion. A multiarea, multisector search-and-matching model with imperfect mobility across industries and downward nominal wage rigidity can reproduce these cross-sectional patterns.

Deb, J. (2019). "Cooperation and Community Responsibility." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

I consider markets in which participants have very little information: for instance, agents are anonymous, cannot verify each other?s identities, or have little information about each other?s past transactions. I ask whether it is possible to prevent opportunistic behavior in such settings in the absence of contractual enforcement. I model such markets as repeated anonymous-random-matching games and show that cooperation is sustainable if players are sufficiently patient and can announce their name (though unverifiable) before every transaction. Cooperation is achieved by ?community responsibility?: if a player deviates, her entire community is held responsible and punished by the victim. Sustaining cooperation involves partial authentication of identities by checking players? knowledge about past transactions.

Decarolis, F., et al. (2019). "Subsidy Design in Privately Provided Social Insurance: Lessons from Medicare Part D." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

The efficiency of publicly subsidized, privately provisioned social insurance programs depends on the interaction between strategic insurers and the subsidy mechanism. We study this interaction in the context of Medicare?s prescription drug coverage program. We find that the observed mechanism is successful in keeping ?raise-the-subsidy? incentives relatively low, acts much like a flat voucher, and obtains a level of welfare close to that for the optimal voucher. Across a range of counterfactuals, we find that more efficient subsidy mechanisms share three features: they retain the marginal elasticity of demand, limit the exercise of market power, and preserve the link between prices and marginal costs.

Doyle, O. (2019). "The First 2,000 Days and Child Skills." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

Using a randomized experiment, this study investigates the impact of sustained investment in parenting, from pregnancy until age 5, in the context of extensive welfare provision. Providing the Preparing for Life program, incorporating home visiting, group parenting, and baby massage, to disadvantaged Irish families raised children?s cognitive and socioemotional/behavioral scores by two-thirds and one-quarter of a standard deviation, respectively. There were few differential effects by gender and stronger gains for firstborns and lower-resource households. The program also narrowed the socioeconomic gap in children?s skills. Analyses account for small sample size, differential attrition, multiple testing, contamination, and performance bias.

Fang, D., et al. (2019). "Turning Up the Heat: The Discouraging Effect of Competition in Contests." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

We study contests in which contestants are homogeneous and have convex effort costs. Increasing contest competitiveness, by making prizes more unequal, scaling up the competition, or adding new contestants, always discourages effort. These results have significant implications: although often criticized as evidence of laxity or cronyism, muting competition (e.g., adopting softer grading curves or less high-powered promotion systems) can both reduce inequality and increase output. Holding promotion contests at the division level rather than the firm level can boost employees? effort. Our results are also consistent with personnel policies that feature egalitarian pay systems and dismissal of worst-performing employees.

Frederiksen, A., et al. (2019). "Supervisors and Performance Management Systems." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

We study how heterogeneity in performance evaluations across supervisors affects employee and supervisor careers and firm outcomes using data on the performance system of a Scandinavian service sector firm. Supervisors vary widely in how they rate subordinates of similar quality. In our model, this ratings heterogeneity can arise because supervisors can differ in their ability to manage subordinates or in their leniency when rating subordinates. Furthermore, firms might or might not be informed about this heterogeneity. The evidence suggests that supervisor heterogeneity stems, in part, from real differences in managerial ability that firms are partially informed about.

Ito, K. and S. Zhang (2019). "Willingness to Pay for Clean Air: Evidence from Air Purifier Markets in China." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

We develop a framework to estimate willingness to pay for clean air from defensive investments on differentiated products. Applying this framework to scanner data on air purifier sales in China, we find that a household is willing to pay $1.34 annually to remove 1 ?g/m3 of air pollution (PM10) and $32.7 annually to eliminate the pollution induced by the Huai River heating policy. Substantial heterogeneity is explained by income and exposure to information on air pollution. Using these estimates, we evaluate various environmental policies and quantify the value of recent air quality improvements since China declared a war on pollution in 2014.

Jacobsen, M. R., et al. (2019). "The Use of Regression Statistics to Analyze Imperfect Pricing Policies." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

Corrective taxes can solve many market failures, but actual policies frequently deviate from the theoretical ideal because of administrative or political constraints. We present a method to quantify the efficiency costs of constraints on externality-correcting policies or, more generally, the costs of imperfect pricing, using simple regression statistics. Under certain conditions, the R2 and the sum of squared residuals from a regression of true externalities on policy variables measure relative welfare gains from policies. We illustrate via four empirical applications: random mismeasurement of externalities, imperfect electricity pricing, heterogeneity in the longevity of energy-consuming durable goods, and imperfect spatial policy differentiation.

Karle, H., et al. (2019). "Segmentation versus Agglomeration: Competition between Platforms with Competitive Sellers." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

For many products, platforms enable sellers to transact with buyers. We show that the competitive conditions among sellers shape the market structure in platform industries. If product market competition is tough, sellers avoid competitors by joining different platforms. This allows platforms to sustain high fees and explains why, for example, in some online markets, several homogeneous platforms segment the market. Instead, if product market competition is soft, agglomeration on a single platform emerges, and platforms fight for the dominant position. These insights give rise to novel predictions. For instance, market concentration and fees are negatively correlated in platform industries, which inverts the standard logic of competition.

Maggiori, M., et al. (2019). "International Currencies and Capital Allocation." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

We establish currency as an important factor shaping global portfolios. Using a new security-level data set, we demonstrate that investor holdings are biased toward their own currencies to such an extent that countries typically hold most of the foreign-debt securities denominated in their currency. While large firms issue in foreign currency and borrow from foreigners, most firms issue only in local currency and do not directly access foreign capital. These patterns hold broadly across countries except for the United States, as foreign investors hold significant shares of US dollar bonds. The share of dollar-denominated cross-border holdings surged after 2008.

Pomatto, L., et al. (2019). "Stochastic Dominance under Independent Noise." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

Stochastic dominance is a crucial tool for the analysis of choice under risk. It is typically analyzed as a property of two gambles that are taken in isolation. We study how additional independent sources of risk (e.g., uninsurable labor risk, house price risk) can affect the ordering of gambles. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, background risk can be strong enough to render lotteries that are ranked by their expectation ranked in terms of first-order stochastic dominance. We extend our results to second-order stochastic dominance and show how they lead to a novel and elementary axiomatization of mean-variance preferences.

Ray, D. and R. Vohra (2019). "Games of Love and Hate." Journal of Political Economy: 000-000.

A strategic situation with payoff-based externalities is one in which a player?s payoff depends on her own action and others? payoffs. We place restrictions on the resulting interdependent utility system that generate a standard normal form, referred to as a ?game of love and hate.? Our central theorem states that every equilibrium of a game of love and hate is Pareto optimal. While externalities are restricted to flow only through payoffs, there are no other constraints: they could be positive or negative or of varying sign. We examine the philosophical implications of the restrictions that underlie this theorem.

Pairwise Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier

Tommy Andersson, Jörgen Kratz

The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 87, Issue 3, May 2020, Pages 1091–1133, https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz018

• Abstract
  Advances in medical technology have made kidney transplants over the blood group barrier feasible. This article investigates how such technology should be implemented when designing pairwise kidney exchange programs. The possibility to receive a kidney transplant from a blood group incompatible donor motivates an extension of the preference domain, allowing patients to distinguish between compatible donors and half-compatible donors (i.e. blood group incompatible donors that only become compatible after undergoing an immunosuppressive treatment). It is demonstrated that the number of transplants can be substantially increased by providing an incentive for patients with half-compatible donors to participate in kidney exchange programs. The results also suggest that the technology is beneficial for patient groups that are traditionally disadvantaged in kidney exchange programs (e.g. blood group O patients). The positive effect of allowing transplants over the blood group barrier is larger than the corresponding effects of including altruistic patient–donor pairs or of allowing three-way exchanges in addition to pairwise exchanges.
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Competing Teams

• Abstract
  In many economic applications of matching, the teams that form compete later in market structures with strategic interactions or with knowledge spillovers. Such post-match competition introduces externalities at the matching stage: a team’s payoff depends not only on their members’ attributes but also on those of other matched teams. This article develops a large market model of matching with externalities, in which first teams form, and then they compete. We analyse the sorting patterns that ensue under competitive equilibrium as well as their efficiency properties. Our main results show that insights substantially differ from those of the standard model without externalities: there can be multiple competitive equilibria with different sorting patterns; both optimal and competitive equilibrium matching can involve randomization; and competitive equilibrium can be inefficient with a matching that can drastically deviate from the optimal one. We also shed light on the economic relevance of our matching model with externalities. We analyse two economic applications that illustrate how our model can rationalize the trend in within- and between-firm inequality, and also the evolution of markups of sectors where firms have market power.
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International Financial Integration and Crisis Contagion

• Abstract
  International financial integration helps to diversify risk but also may spread crises across countries. We provide a quantitative analysis of this trade-off in a two-country general equilibrium model with collateral-constrained borrowing using a global solution method. Borrowing constraints bind occasionally, depending upon the state of the economy and levels of inherited debt. We examine different degrees of international financial integration, moving from financial autarky, to bond and equity market integration. Financial integration leads to a significant increase in global leverage, substantially escalates the probability of crises for any one country, and dramatically increases the degree of “contagion” across countries. Outside of crises, the impact of financial integration on macroeconomic aggregates is relatively small. But the impact of a crisis with integrated international financial markets is much less severe than that under financial market autarky. Thus, a trade-off emerges between the probability of crises and the severity of crises. Using a large cross-country database of financial crises in developing and developed economies over a forty-year period, we find evidence in support of the model.
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Labour Market Frictions, Firm Growth, and International Trade

• Abstract
  I study the aggregate effects of labour market frictions in a small open economy where firms grow slowly and make fixed export investments. The model features interactions between dynamic investments in exporting and search frictions with job-to-job mobility. A calibration to Argentina’s economy matching data on firm growth, worker transitions between firms, and export dynamics suggests that the real income gains from lowering frictions in job-to-job transitions are about seven times larger than comparable reductions in frictions from unemployment. Barriers to worker mobility across firms matter for the real income gains of trade-cost reductions.
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Rank Effects in Bargaining: Evidence from Government Formation

• Abstract
  Theories of multilateral bargaining and coalition formation applied to legislatures predict that parties’ seat shares determine their bargaining power. We present findings that are difficult to reconcile with this prediction, but consistent with a norm prescribing that “the most voted party should form the government”. We first present case studies from several countries and regression discontinuity design-based evidence from twenty-eight national European parliaments. We then focus on 2,898 Spanish municipal elections in which two parties tie in the number of seats. We find that the party with slightly more general election votes is substantially more likely to appoint the mayor. Since tied parties should (on average) have equal bargaining power, this identifies the effect of being labeled the most voted. This effect is comparable to that of obtaining an additional seat, and is also present when a right-wing party is the most voted and the second and third most voted parties are allied left-wing parties who can form a combined majority. A model where elections both aggregate information and discipline incumbents can rationalize our results and yields additional predictions we take to the data, such as voters punishing second most voted parties that appoint mayors.
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The Pecking Order of Segmentation and Liquidity-Injection Policies in a Model of Contagious Crises

• Abstract
  We study a two-country setting in which leveraged investors generate fire-sale externalities, leading to financial crises and contagion. Governments can affect the incidence of financial crisis and the degree of contagion by injecting public liquidity and, additionally, by segmenting the countries’ liquidity markets. We show that segmentation allows a country to avoid contagion and fend off mild financial crises caused by a small shock to its liquidity demand, at the cost of exposing it to more severe financial crises caused by a large shock. We derive a “pecking order” result, whereby segmentation is a second-best measure that coordinated governments should use only when tax capacity constrains them from injecting liquidity. Even when segmentation is welfare-enhancing, it should be applied to public liquidity alone, never restricting the free flow of private liquidity across countries. Uncoordinated governments tend to use segmentation excessively.
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How Do Foreclosures Exacerbate Housing Downturns?

• Abstract
  This article uses a structural model to show that foreclosures played a crucial role in exacerbating the recent housing bust and to analyse foreclosure mitigation policy. We consider a dynamic search model in which foreclosures freeze the market for non-foreclosures and reduce price and sales volume by eroding lender equity, destroying the credit of potential buyers, and making buyers more selective. These effects cause price-default spirals that amplify an initial shock and help the model fit both national and cross-sectional moments better than a model without foreclosure. When calibrated to the recent bust, the model reveals that the amplification generated by foreclosures is significant: ruined credit and choosey buyers account for 25.4% of the total decline in non-distressed prices and lender losses account for an additional 22.6%. For policy, we find that principal reduction is less cost-effective than lender equity injections or introducing a single seller that holds foreclosures off the market until demand rebounds. We also show that policies that slow down the pace of foreclosures can be counterproductive.
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Estimation with Aggregate Shocks

• Abstract
  Aggregate shocks affect most households’ and firms’ decisions. Using three stylized models, we show that inference based on cross-sectional data alone generally fails to correctly account for decision making of rational agents facing aggregate uncertainty. We propose an econometric framework that overcomes these problems by explicitly parameterizing the agents’ decision problem relative to aggregate shocks. Our framework and examples illustrate that the cross-sectional and time-series aspects of the model are often interdependent. Therefore, estimation of model parameters in the presence of aggregate shocks requires the combined use of cross-sectional and time-series data. We provide easy-to-use formulas for test statistics and confidence intervals that account for the interaction between the cross-sectional and time-series variation. Lastly, we perform Monte Carlo simulations that highlight the properties of the proposed method and the risks of not properly accounting for the presence of aggregate shocks.
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National Industry Trade Shocks, Local Labour Markets, and Agglomeration Spillovers

• Abstract
  Using a broad set of national industry trade shocks, I employ a novel approach to estimate agglomeration effects by exploiting within industry variation in indirect exposure to the other local industries’ (national) trade shocks across local labour markets. This variation stems from differences in local industry composition and allows to test for the existence of heterogeneous agglomeration effects across industries. I find considerable employment spillovers from other tradable industries’ trade shocks and even stronger effects within the same broad sector. Spillovers are larger for industries employing similar workers and are triggered predominantly by shocks to high-technology industries.
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Frictional Intermediation in Over-the-Counter Markets

• Abstract
  We extend Duffie et al.’s (2005) search-theoretic model of over-the-counter (OTC) asset markets, allowing for a decentralizedinter-dealer market with arbitrary heterogeneity in dealers’ valuations (or, equivalently, inventory costs). We develop a solution technique that makes the model fully tractable and allows us to derive, in closed form, theoretical formulas for key statistics analysed in empirical studies of the intermediation process in OTC markets. A calibration to the market for municipal bonds allows us to quantify important unobservable characteristics of this market, including the severity of search and bargaining frictions and the nature of heterogeneity across dealers. We use our calibrated model to study the effect of these market characteristics on total welfare and the distribution of gains from trade across customers and dealers.
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Macroprudential Regulation versus mopping up after the crash

• Abstract
  How should macroprudential policy be designed when policymakers also have access to liquidity provision tools to manage crises? We show in a tractable model of systemic banking risk that there are three factors at play: first, ex post liquidity provision mitigates financial crises, and this reduces the need for macroprudential policy. In the extreme, if liquidity provision is untargeted and costless or if it completely forestalls crises by credible out-of-equilibrium lending-of-last-resort, there is no role left for macroprudential regulation. Second, however, macroprudential policy needs to consider the ex ante incentive effects of targeted liquidity provision. Third, if shadow banking reduces the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments, it is optimal to commit to less generous liquidity provision as a second-best substitute for macroprudential policy.
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How Quantitative Easing Works: Evidence on the Refinancing Channel

• Abstract
  We document the transmission of large-scale asset purchases by the Federal Reserve to the real economy using rich borrower-linked mortgage-market data and an identification strategy based on mortgage market segmentation. We find that central bank QE1 MBS purchases substantially increased refinancing activity, reduced interest payments for refinancing households, led to a boom in equity extraction, and increased aggregate consumption. Relative to QE-ineligible jumbo mortgages, QE-eligible conforming mortgage interest rates fell by an additional 40 bp and refinancing volumes increased by an additional 56% during QE1. We estimate that households refinancing during QE1 increased their durable consumption by 12%. Our results highlight that the transmission of unconventional monetary policy to the real economy depends crucially on the composition of assets purchased and the degree of segmentation in the market.
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Does Advertising Serve as a Signal? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Mobile Search

• Abstract
  We develop a field experiment that assesses whether advertising can serve as a signal that enhances consumers’ evaluations of advertised goods. We implement the experiment on a mobile search platform that provides listings and reviews for an archetypal experience good, restaurants. In collaboration with the platform, we randomize about 200,000 users in 13 Asian cities into exposure of ads for about 600+ local restaurants. Within the exposure group, we randomly vary the disclosure to the consumer of whether a restaurant’s listing is a paid-ad. This enables isolating the effect on outcomes of a user knowing that a listing is sponsored—a pure signalling effect. We find that this disclosure increases calls to the restaurant by 77%, holding fixed all other attributes of the ad. The disclosure effect is higher when the consumer uses the platform away from his typical city of search, when the uncertainty about restaurant quality is larger, and for restaurants that have received fewer ratings in the past. On the supply side, newer, higher rated and more popular restaurants are found to advertise more on the platform; and ratings of those that advertised during the experiment are found to be higher two years later. Taken together, we interpret these results as consistent with a signalling equilibrium in which ads serve as implicit signals that enhance the appeal of the advertised restaurants to consumers. Both consumers and advertisers seem to benefit from the signalling. Consumers shift choices towards restaurants that are better rated (at baseline) in the disclosure group compared to the no disclosure group, and advertisers gain from the improved outcomes induced by disclosure.
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