赵鼎新老师曾在《社会学评论》上一篇文章打个比方，斯科特的“弱者的武器”，衍生出来了学界的各种类似的用法，形成了所谓的“连锁店”效应。尽管李连江老师也反驳批评自己的概念并不来自于此，但确实在学界上，landmarks带来的self-references效应，非常显著。

这种连锁效应，不止是理论—经验间的application，也涉及到理论自身的发展。

不妨，以布迪厄的惯习（habitus）为例来看。

布迪厄的场域—惯习的概念对子，把惯习看成生成性、倾向性的、内在的结构，因此招致一种批评：在布迪厄那里，行动者没有自主性或能动性（agency），或最近学界爱用的词：反思性。

如何给布迪厄擦屁股呢？这是一条产业链。

如果说“弱者的武器”（本身的含糊、隐喻或描述）带来的各种经验研究发展，是theoretical growth上的proliferation和elaboration（扩散和详述），（见Wagner, David G. and Joseph Berger. 1985. “Do Sociological Theories Grow?” American Journal of Sociology 90(4):697–728.

）。那么布迪厄的惯习概念的不足，演变出来的，更多的是variation和integration（变异和整合）。

1.  批判布迪厄对agency理解不够，无法解释social change，的文献：

Alexander, 1995; Archer, 2007, 2009, 2012; King, 2000; Mouzelis, 2003 

2. 将布迪厄归为the quasi-determinism

 Decoteau, 2016; Nash, 2003; Potter, 2000

3. 捍卫布迪厄的晚期作品，有agency/change的关注，不那么决定论的了

Faber, 2017; Hilgers, 2009 Friedman, 2016

4. 想找到布迪厄文本中，其实也有agency的证据（不管多少，或融合得怎么样）

Elder-vass, 2007（之前推送过）；Bouzanis  and Kemp 2019

惯习理论新见：把行动的反思性带回来

5. 喜欢把惯习，混合起来，带成反思性之类的论述

Adams 2006，还有Crossley 2003（"激进的惯习"最近翻译出版他的《走向关系社会学》也有另一种对布迪厄的批判）

Adams, M. (2006). Hybridizing habitus and reflexivity: Towards an understanding of contemporary identity? Sociology, 40(3), 511–528.

Alexander, J. C. (1995). Fin de siècle social theory: Relativism, reduction, and the problem of reason. London: Verso 

Archer, M. S. (2007). Making our way through the world: Human reflexivity and social mobility. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Archer, M. S. (2009). Can reflexivity and habitus work in tandem? In M. S. Archer (Ed.), Conversations about reflexivity (pp. 135–155). London: Routledge.

Archer, M. S. (2012). The reflexive imperative in late modernity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Bohman, J. (1997). Reflexivity, agency and constraint: The paradoxes of Bourdieu's sociology of knowledge. Social Epistemology, 11(2), 171–186. 

Crossley, N. (2003). From reproduction to transformation: Social movement fields and the radical habitus. Theory, Culture & Society, 20(6), 43–68.

Decoteau, C. L. (2016). The reflexive habitus: Critical realist and Bourdieusian social action. European Journal of Social Theory, 19(3), 303–321.

Elder-Vass, D. (2007). Reconciling Archer and Bourdieu in an emergentist theory of action. Sociological Theory, 25 (4), 325–346 

Faber, A. (2017). From false premises to false conclusions. On Pierre Bourdieu's alleged sociological determinism. The American Sociologist, 48(3–4), 436–452 

Friedman, S. (2016). Habitus clivé and the emotional imprint of social mobility. The Sociological Review, 64(1), 129–147.

Hilgers, M. (2009). Habitus, freedom, and reflexivity. Theory & Psychology, 19(6), 728–755.

King, A. (2000). Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: A 'practical' critique of the habitus. Sociological Theory, 18(3), 417–433.

Lizardo, O. (2004). The cognitive origins of Bourdieu's habitus. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 34(4), 375–401.

Mead, G. (2016). Bourdieu and conscious deliberation: An anti-mechanistic solution. European Journal of Social Theory, 19(1), 57–73.

Mouzelis, N. (2003). Sociological theory: what went wrong?: diagnosis and remedies. London: Routledge.

Nash, R. (2003). Social explanation and socialization: On Bourdieu and the structure, disposition, practice scheme. The Sociological Review, 51(1), 43–62

Potter, G. (2000). For Bourdieu, against Alexander: Reality and reduction. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 30(2), 229–246.

Sayer, A. (2010). Reflexivity and the habitus. In M. S. Archer (Ed.), Conversations about reflexivity (pp. 108–122). London: Routledge

（sociological理论大缸第352期）